Rodriguez, et al v. Cambridge Housing Authority, Middlesex Superior Court C.A. No: 95-4904
Type of Action: Premises Liability
Injuries Alleged: Severe emotional distress, cuts, trauma from being “hog-tied”
Verdict: $268,400 total jury award (prior to adjustment for State Tort Claims Act)
Date: August 17, 1999
Case Summary:
This case arose out of three home invasions occurring over approximately a three week period at a housing project in Cambridge, MA. The plaintiffs were a mother and her two sons. The youngest son resided with his mother and was twelve years old at the time of the home invasions. The mother testified that prior to the home invasions she had complained to the housing project manager that her kitchen windows would not lock and requested that the locks be replaced. On May 12, 1994, the first home invasion occurred, during which the mother was attacked by a masked intruder. The investigating police detective testified that after the first home invasion and prior to the second home invasion, he met with the housing project manager and told him that he believed an unauthorized person had a key to the front door and that the locks should be changed. The mother also testified that she also requested that the front door lock be changed prior to the second home invasion. It was undisputed that her lease with the CHA prohibited her from changing the door lock herself or hiring anyone to do so. On May 18, 1994, a second home invasion occurred during which the mother was hogtied and tortured. Her younger son heard her in distress and broke into her locked bedroom (the assailant had fled through the window). He found his mother hogtied and gasping for breath. He and his sister were unable to free his mother who remained in this condition until the police arrived. The younger son accompanied his mother to the hospital in the ambulance and was admitted for an extensive psychiatric hospitalization during which suicide precautions were taken. On the day that the plaintiff mother was released from the hospital and was returning home with the two other plaintiffs, the third home invasion occurred. They heard a noise in the apartment and an intruder running from the apartment. The elder son gave chase and was injured when attacked by the person believed to be the intruder. The plaintiff mother was further emotionally traumatized by this incident. Finally, following the third home invasion, the defendant changed the front door lock and the invasions ceased. Both the investigating detective and plaintiff’s expert agreed that entry during the invasions was either through a kitchen window or the front door. The evidence at trial, including the testimony of the plaintiff mother’s treating psychologist was that the mother, who had an extensive prior psychiatric history, was emotionally devastated by these invasions. The evidence was that the younger son, who still has difficulty talking about the invasions also suffered serious emotional trauma.
The defendant’s housing manager denied that the plaintiff or the police detective had ever requested or suggested that the window or door locks be replaced until after the third home invasion. The defendant also argued that the window locks were not in a defective condition. The defendant also argued that the CHA was a public entity under Ch. 258 and therefore it was immune from liability for failing to change the door lock under Section 10 (j) of that chapter. Plaintiffs argued that the CHA’s failure to change both the windows and door locks constituted negligence maintenance of property for which CHA is liable under ch. 258 based not only on numerous lease provisions, but also upon the trial testimony of the defendant’s project manager who admitted that changing door locks was “routine maintenance”. The jury found in answer to special questions that the defendant was “negligent with respect to maintenance of the premises” and violated the lease due to its failure to change the door locks and that this was a proximate cause of the second and third home invasions. The jury awarded the plaintiff mother $170,000 for her injuries and damages due to the second invasion and $30,000 due to her injuries and damages for the third home invasion. It awarded the younger son plaintiff $130,000 for his emotional distress as a result of the second home invasion. It did not find the defendant’s negligence to be a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the elder son plaintiff.